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COURT INTERPRETERS: STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE AND STANDARDS FOR TRAINING
Franklyn P. Salimbenet
I. INTRODUCTION
During the second half of this century with the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 19641 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,2 it became pub-
lic policy to eliminate discrimination across the whole spectrum of the
nation's life. Utilizing constitutional and statutory rationales, the judici-
ary has taken the lead in these efforts.3 As the chief vehicle for the elimi-
nation of discrimination in the life of the nation, the judiciary has also
had to face the issue of bias4 in its own daily workings. Racial, ethnic,
and cultural bias in judicial proceedings have been the focus of studies
undertaken by the courts in a number of states.5 Invariably, evaluators
t Franklyn P. Salimbene, J.D., LL.M., is director of the Legal and Medical Interpreter
Certificate Program and adjunct assistant professor of law at- Bentley College, Waltham,
Massachusetts.
I Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.S. §1447;
42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1990)).
2 Pub. L. No. 89-110,79 Stat. 445 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1971,
1973-1973p (1990)).
3 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (allowing for the application of
congressional authority to promote the hiring of minority-owned businesses in public works
projects); United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (protecting the poor
on welfare from the termination of food stamp assistance simply because they were not related
to others in their household); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
(allowing for the implementation of school busing to eliminate discrimination in public
schools); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (declaring unconstitutional laws that prohibit
mixed-race marriages); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (declar-
ing unconstitutional, as discriminatory against the poor, state laws requiring the payment of a
poll tax in order to vote).
4 For the purposes of its study on bias in Georgia's state courts, the Georgia Supreme
Court Commission has defined "bias" as follows:
Bias is a preference or inclination that inhibits impartial judgment. Bias includes
intentional or unintentional acts or attitudes resulting from either individual or group
actions. Specifically, systemic or institutional bias differs from individual bias or
prejudice. Institutional bias exists when one group uses its power to put its collec-
tive prejudices or inclinations into effect and to establish these as the norms for the
entire system.
GEORGIA SUPREME COURT COMM'N ON RAcAL & ETiIc BAs IN THE COURT Sys., L-r Jus-
TICE BE DONE EQUALLY, FAIRLY AND IMPARTLALLY, reprinted in 12 GA .ST. U. L. REv. 687,
699 (1996) [hereinafter GEORGIA REPORT].
5 Reports have been published by the following states: FLORIDA SUPREME COURT RA-
cLAL & ETHmc BIAs STUDY COMMII'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, WHERE THE INJURED
FLY FOR JUSTICE (1990) (a second Florida report with the same title was issued in 1991)
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have concluded that the judicial process is not yet free from the corrosive
effects of bias. On this point, the Final Report of the Commission to
Study Racial and Ethnic Bias in the Courts of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts concluded that ". . . discriminatory behavior, based on
racial bias or stereotype, exists throughout the courts."'6
While these state court studies have focused broadly on the issue of
bias throughout the judicial process, each study has looked carefully at
bias in court proceedings faced by individuals who do not speak Eng-
lish.7 The report of the Georgia Supreme Court Commission on Racial
and Ethnic Bias in the Court System, for example, quoted approvingly a
Hispanic attorney who stated that Hispanic criminal defendants are at an
"immediate disadvantage" because the Georgia court system is not pre-
pared to deal with language communication problems. 8 Based on this
and similar testimony, the members of the Georgia Commission con-
cluded that the "lack of information and understanding of the court sys-
tem, especially among the poor and recent immigrants, results in people
being unaware of their rights, leading to fear and distrust of the legal
system and ultimately to restricted access to the courts."9 A non-English
speaking witness or criminal defendant's limited access to courts because
[hereinafter SECOND FLORIDA REPORT]; GEORGIA REPORT, supra note 4; COMMISSION TO
STUDY RACIAL & ETHNIC BIAS IN THE COURTS, MASS. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, FINAL RE-
PORT: ELIMINATING THE BARRIERS: EQUAL JUSTICE (1994) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS RE-
PORT]; TASK FORCE ON RACIAL/ETHNIC ISSUES IN THE COURTS, MICH. SUPREME COURT, FINAL
REPORT (1989); MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL
Sys., FINAL REPORT (1993) [hereinafter MINNESOTA REPORT]; NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
TASK FORCE ON MINORITY CONCERNS, FINAL REPORT (1992); NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL
COMMISSION ON MINORITIES, REPORT (1991); OREGON SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RA-
CiALJETHNIC ISSUES IN THE JUDICIAL SYS., OR. JUDICIAL DEP'T, REPORT (1994) [hereinafter
OREGON REPORT]; WASHINGTON STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE TASK FORCE, WASH. STATE
SUPREME COURT, FINAL REPORT (1990). For a review of state responses to the earlier pub-
lished reports, see Suellyn Scamecchia, State Responses to Task Force Reports on Race and
Ethnic Bias in the Courts, 16 HAMLINE L. REv. 923 (1993).
6 MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 5, at 18. See also Scamecchia, supra note 5, at
924 (affirming that there is "very real evidence" of bias in state courts generally).
7 SECOND FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 5, at 12-20; GEORGIA REPORT, supra note 4, at
734-749; MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 5, at 33-50; MINNESOTA REPORT, supra note 5,
at 69-78; OREGON REPORT, supra note 5, at 9-18.
8 GEORGIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 737.
9 Id. at 737-738. Similar conclusions were reached in the other reports. See, e.g., SEC-
OND FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 5, at 16 ("Language barriers in criminal cases can, for all
practical purposes, render a defendant absent from his own trial and defense."); MASSACHU-
sarrs REPORT, supra note 5, at 34 ("Without communication and understanding, individuals
are unable to participate in, to benefit from, to access the protection of the courts or otherwise
to obtain a fair and impartial hearing from the legal system."); OREGON REPORT, supra note 5,
at 14 ("Significant numbers of non-English-speaking litigants are disadvantaged because they
cannot understand the court system and its decisions.").
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of an inability to understand English raises serious questions related to
due process and the right to confrontation. 10
These constitutional issues in the context of language barriers in
judicial proceedings are compounded by the explosion in the number of
non-English speaking residents in the United States. In a 1995 study on
court interpretation published by the National Center for State Courts
(hereinafter NCSC), it was estimated that between 1980 and 1990, while
the total population of the United States increased by 10%, the nation's
Hispanic population increased by 53%, and the Asian and Pacific Is-
lander minority populations increased by 108%. 11 Correspondingly, ju-
dicial proceedings in federal courts for which a witness or defendant was
assigned an interpreter increased significantly between 1980 and 1990.
Statistics published by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
show, for example, that during the same ten-year period, Spanish lan-
guage interpreter use in federal courts increased from 23,394 to 53,240.12
Projections based upon these trends are that the immigration rate be-
tween 1990 and 1994 was the highest five-year rate since the turn of the
century and that within ten years, ispanics will even outnumber Afri-
can-Americans in the United States.13
To protect the constitutional rights at trial of this increasing number
of non-English speakers, one common recommendation of the various
state court bias reports has been to require the appointment of language
interpreters in judicial proceedings. 14 While. this recommendation raises
10 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389-90 (2d Cir.
1970) (stating that inadequate interpretation of witness testimony denied defendant's right to
confrontation); People v. Menchaca, 194 Cal. Rptr. 691, 694 (1983) (holding that a defend-
ant's impaired understanding at a preliminary hearing due to his inability to speak English is
prejudicial and violative of due process); Chavez v. Indiana, 534 N.E.2d 731, 737 (Ind. 1989)
("The interpreter is necessary to implement fundamental notions of due process such as the
right to be present at trial, the right to confront one's accusers, and the right to counsel."); In re
Garcia, 670 P.2d 672, 673 (Wash. App. 1983) (holding that a non-English-speaking defendant
was prejudiced by not being advised through an interpreter of his right to confront his accus-
ers). The United States Supreme Court has not spoken on point regarding whether there is a
federal constitutional right to an interpreter in proceedings in which a defendant or witness
does not speak English. The Court did, however, hold that a non-English speaking criminal
defendant is denied due process when he or she is sentenced to life imprisonment in a trial at
which the arresting officer served as an interpreter and defendant had no attorney. Marino v.
Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 562 (1947).
11 WiLLIAM E. Hxvrrr, COURT INTERPRETATION: MODEL GUIDES FOR POLICY & PRAC-
TICE IN Tm STATE CouRTs 11 (1995) [hereinafter MODEL GuIDEs]. See also MAssACHUsErrs
REPORT, supra note 5, at 9, and GEORGIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 698 (showing a significant
increase in non-English-speaking residents in those states).
12 Patricia Michelsen-Whitley, Court Interpreting, 3 CT. MOmT. & ADMIN. REP. 1, 4
(1992).
13 Peter Francese, America at Mid-Decade, Am. DEMOGRAPHICS, Feb. 1995, at 23, 26-27.
14 SECOND FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 5, at 17 ("Court interpreters should be made
available to an individual for whom English is not the primary language at the first stage of the
criminal process at which his or her liberty is at risk."); GEORGIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 746
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a number of questions, 15 it presumes that there are or will be an adequate
number of trained interpreters ready to perform the necessary tasks. Un-
fortunately, as the report of the NCSC concluded, there is already "a
shortage of qualified court interpreters."'16 This NCSC finding is echoed
in the various state reports. 17
In view of this agreed shortage of competent language interpreters,
the focus of the discussion on bias in the judiciary needs to turn to the
training of interpreters. This article is an attempt to answer three ques-
tions. Part II asks: what are the professional standards of practice neces-
sary to qualify one as a court interpreter? Part III asks: what are the
curriculum guidelines for training individuals to be skilled court inter-
preters? Part IV asks: what are the main issues for colleges and universi-
ties seeking to implement an interpreter training program? The answers
to these questions, as set out below, will support the conclusion that pro-
viding court interpreters who are trained in the standards of practice
("A uniform system of standards for court interpreters should be established. The Supreme
Court... should adopt standards for certification and devise standard instructions regarding
the right to and use of interpreters in all levels of the courts."); MASSACHUSETTS REPORT,
supra note 5, at 49 ("The Trial Court should create and fund a coordinated statewide system
for the provision of available and qualified interpreters and interpreter services in all civil and
criminal proceedings of any nature before a judge or clerk magistrate."); MINNESOTA REPORT,
supra note 5, at 77 ("The Supreme Court should recommend and the Legislature should estab-
lish and fund a State Board of Interpretive Services to propose standards and procedures for
the training... of certified interpreters."); OREGON REPORT, supra note 5, at 18 ("Interpreters
should be provided in all court proceedings, including court-supervised arbitration and media-
tion."); see also Scarnecchia, supra note 5, at 937-938.
15 The questions raised by the appointment of court interpreters seem to fall roughly into
three categories: legal, political, and ethical. The legal issues surrounding the appointment of
court interpreters are closely tied to the constitutional rights of non-English-speakers, see
supra text accompanying note 10, and most often relate to the bounds of judicial discretion
exercised by judges in those cases where one or more of the parties/witnesses are non-English
speakers. The political issues reach to questions of funding court interpreter services and are
particularly inauspicious when states experience budgetary constrictions. Further, the impact
of the movement in several states to make English the official language, while uncertain, does
not portend well for an enthusiastic embrace by legislators and governors of increased funding
for the needs of non-English-speakers. The New York Times recently noted that twenty-three
states have enacted laws declaring English to be the official state language. At a Glance:
English Only Please, N.Y. TwMEs, Aug. 31, 1996, at A7 (graphic). The ethical issues raised
by the appointment of court interpreters speak directly to the role of the interpreter in judicial
proceedings vis-d-vis the role of the non-English-speaker, the lawyer, and the court itself.
Ethical considerations have led to the establishment in a number of states of standards of
practice for court interpreters. A discussion of the interpreter's ethical obligations under the
standards of practice is part of the subject of this paper. See infra Part II.C.
16 MODEL GuIDES, supra note 11, at 13.
17 See, e.g., GEORGIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 747 ("Problem statement: .Lack of availa-
bility of 'certified' interpreters."); MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 5, at 40 ("... the
Commission's surveys of attorneys and judges reveal that interpreter services are not readily
available."); OREGON REPORT, supra note 5, at 14 ("Interpreters are often not available in
offices that are associated with the court system .... At times, interpreters are not readily
available in the courtroom itself.").
[Vol. 6:645
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under the appropriate college-level curriculum guidelines will improve
non-English speakers' access to justice.
II. PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR
COURT INTERPRETERS
The professional standards of practice imposed by those state courts
that have set standards seem to fall generally into three somewhat over-
lapping categories. These categories are accuracy, honesty, and profes-
sionalism. They are cited in various state codes of professional
responsibility for court interpreters. 18 These codes, where they exist, are
commonly issued by the administrative office of fhe courts. The purpose
of these codes generally is to assure equal treatment in court proceedings
for individuals who do not speak English and thereby promote the ad-
ministration of justice.19
A. AccURAcY
As the first professional standard of practice, accuracy requires the
language interpreter to "interpret or translate the material thoroughly and
18 CAL. CODE ANN., RULES OF THE COURT, App. Div. I, § 18.3 STANDARDS OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT FOR COURT INTERPRETERs (Deering 1996) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA CODE];
HAw. REv. STAT. ANN., COURT RULE, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCr FOR COURT INTER-
PR=ERs (Michie 1996) [hereinafter HAWAii CODE]; OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ADMIN. JUST=
MASS. TRIAL CT., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuT FOR COURT INTERPRETERS OF THE TRIAL
COURT (1988) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS CODE]; MINN. STAT., COURT RuLES, CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY FOR INTERPRETERS IN THE MINN. STATE COURT SYS. (1996)
[hereinafter MINNESOTA CODE]; N.J. STAT., COURT RULES, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
FOR INTERPRETERS, TRANSLITERATORS, & TRANSLATORS (1996) [hereinafter NEW JERSEY
CODE]; OREGON RULES OF COURT, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERPRETERS
IN ThE OR. COURTS (West 1997) [hereinafter OREGON CODE]; WASH. RULES OF CT. ANN.,
Rule 11.1 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COURT INTERPRETERS (1994) [hereinafter WASHINGTON
CODE]. In addition to these state codes, the Federal Court Interpreters Board developed a code
for U.S. Courts (CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIL1TY OF THE OFFICIAL INTERPRETERS OF
TiE U.S. COURTS (1979) [hereinafter FEDERAL CODE]). The Federal Code was developed
pursuant to the enactment of the Court Interpreters Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-539, 92 Stat.
2040 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 602-04, 1827-28). The Act creates a statutory
right to an interpreter in any federal criminal or civil proceeding initiated by the United States
in which a party or witness is a non-English speaker. § 1827.
19 The Massachusetts Code provides an instructive, detailed statement of purpose:
These standards seek to: (a) Assure meaningful access to all Trial Court Depart-
ments and court services for non-English speakers; (b) Protect the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants to the assistance of court interpreter [sic] during court
proceedings; (c) Ensure due process in all phases of litigation for non-English speak-
ers; (d) Ensure equal protection of the law for non-English speakers; (e) Increase
efficiency, quality, -and uniformity in handling proceedings which involve a court
interpreter; (f) Encourage the broadest use of professional language interpreters by
all those in need of such services within the Trial Court.
MASSACHUSETTS CODE, supra note 18, § 1.01 (1)(a)-(f). For a discussion of the historical
basis of the development of the state codes, such as the Massachusetts Code, see supra notes 5-
17 and accompanying text.
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precisely, adding or omitting nothing, and stating as nearly as possible
what has been stated in the language of the speaker, giving consideration
to variations in grammar and syntax for both languages involved. °20 It is
most often listed as the first canon or section of the various codes of
professional responsibility.
Fundamentally, this standard requires the interpreter to mirror in the
target language21 what has been said in the source language. 22 Thus, the
statement or response of the non-English speaking defendant or witness,
which is heard by the judge and jury in English, should be exactly what
was said in the source language. The commentary to the Oregon rule
regarding accuracy states: "This creates an obligation to conserve every
element of information contained in the source language communication
when it is rendered in the target language. '23
This comment in the Oregon rule is telling. The obligation to con-
serve "every element of information" contained in the communication is
far more expansive than if the commentary had required simply a literal
interpretation. Writing in their seminal text on court interpretation, Gon-
zdlez, Vasquez, and Mikkelson (hereinafter Gonzdlez) observe that "....
language communication involves many non-verbal elements in addition
to the words per se."'24 The words are important, of course. For exam-
ple, the Massachusetts Code states, "Each court interpreter shall provide
the most accurate form of a word in spite of a possible vulgar mean-
ing."'25 Quite generally, however, the court rules affirm, "[v]erbatim,
'word for word' or literal oral interpretations are not appropriate when
20 WASHINGTON CODE, supra note 18, b. In view of the distinction between interpret-
ing and translating made in the language of the Washington Code, it ought to be made clear
that the use of the word "interpret" refers to the skill of rendering words spoken "orally" in one
language into those of another language. The word "translate" refers to the skill of rendering
the "written" words of a document into the words of another language.
21 "The target language is the language into which the message is being translated."
ROSEANN DUENAS GONZALEZ ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION: THEORY,
POLICY & PRACTICE 296 (1991).
22 "Source language is the language of the original message, the one being translated 'out
of."' Id.
23 OREGON CODE, supra note 18, § 1 (Commentary). Accord MINNESOTA CODE, supra
note 18, Canon 1 (Commentary); MODEL GUIDES, supra note 11, at 200.
24 GONZALEZ Er AL., supra note 21, at 480.
25 MASSACHUSETTS CODE, supra note 18, § 1.03 (1)(b). Elaborating on the accuracy
standard, the Administrative Office of the Courts of New Mexico instructs its interpreters as
follows:
Nuances of meaning are critical in courtroom testimony. One study found that sub-
tie changes in word choice significantly altered witnesses' recollections of events.
When a key word in the question was changed ("About how fast were the cars going
when they hit/smashed/collided/bumped/contacted each other?"), subjects who were
asked the question that contained the term "smashed" tended to increase their esti-
mate of the speed, and recalled seeing broken glass when in fact there was none.
Thus, you must be very careful in selecting target language terms to make sure that
they accurately and precisely reflect the source language meaning.
COURT INTERPRETERS
they distort the meaning of what was said in the source language ....
Accuracy requires that interpreters bring to their work the ability to con-
vey the totality of what was communicated, both verbal and non-verbal.
"The interpreter has an obligation to convey every aspect of the witness's
testimony, not only words but also paralinguistic elements such as
pauses, false starts, and tone of voice."27
The responsibility of the interpreter under the accuracy standard is,
therefore, broad indeed.28 He must interpret everything that is said while
also conveying the meaning of what is said. The first requirement is that
everything said should be interpreted "even if it appears non-responsive,
obscene, rambling, or incoherent," including apparent misstatements.29
Gonzdlez uses this example taken from a mental health setting to demon-
strate an inaccurate interpretation:
Clinician to Spanish-speaking patient: "What about
worries, do you have many worries?"
Interpreter to patient: "Is there anything that bothers
you?"
Patient's response: "I know, I know that God is with
me, I'm not afraid, they cannot get me [pause] I'm wear-
ing these new pants and I feel protected, I feel good, I
don't get headaches anymore."
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, 1996 ORIENTATION WORKSHOP FOR NEw MEXIco
COURT INTERERmRiS, pt. 3, at 1-2 [hereinafter NEw MExico ANUAL].
26 MINNESOTA CODE, supra note 18, Canon 1 (Commentary). Accord OREGON CODE,
supra note 18, § 1 (Commentary); MODEL GUIDES, supra note 11, at 200. Discussing the
problems posed for interpreters by English idioms like "to run the gamut" and "so much the
better," and English metaphors like "he tore his hair out" and "she was caught red-handed,"
the New Mexico Court Administrative Office tells interpreters: "You must always try to find
an equivalent idiom or metaphor in the target language; do not translate them literally. Re-
member that the primary focus in interpreting is conveying meaning, not translating individual
words." NEw MXco MANUAL, supra note 25, pt. 3, at 2.
27 GoNzALEZ ar AL., supra note 21, at 480. Several of the codes reiterate this obligation
of the interpreter as follows: "The interpreter has a twofold duty: 1) to ensure that the pro-
ceedings reflect in English precisely what was said by a non-English speaking person, and 2)
to place the non-Engish speaking person on an equal footing with those who understand Eng-
lish." MINNESOTA CODE, supra note 18, Canon 1 (Commentary); OREGON CODE, supra note
18, § 1 (Commentary); MODEL GUIDES, supra note 11, at 200.
28 In a decision in which it ruled that police acted illegally by failing to appoint an
independent qualified interpreter immediately after the defendant's arrest, the Minnesota
Supreme Court characterized the world in which interpreters operate as follows: "Translation
obviously is not a single twb-way street between two languages. Rather, it is a busy intersec-
tion at which at least five thoroughfares meet-the two languages with all their eccentricities,
the cultures of the two speech communities, and the speech situation in which the statement
was uttered." State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 832 (Minn. 1987) (quoting PErER FARB,
WORD PLAY: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN PEOPLE TALK 199 (1973)).
29 MINNESOTA CODE, supra note 18, Canon 1 (Commentary); OREGON CODE, supra note
18, § I (Commentary); MODEL GUIDES, supra note 11, at 200.
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Interpreter to clinician: "He says that he is not afraid, he
feels good, he doesn't have headaches anymore. '30
An accurate interpretation by a court interpreter (and, for that matter, a
medical interpreter) would have rendered in the target language exactly
what the speaker said; it would not have summarized or edited as was
done here.31 By failing to render a word-for-word interpretation, the in-
terpreter in this example provided the clinician with no information re-
garding the psychological state of the patient. Indeed, on the basis of the
interpreter's rendering, the clinician could have concluded that the pa-
tient's condition was not related at all to mental instability, but rather to
an occasional headache.
The second requirement of accuracy is that the "meaning" of what
is said also be conveyed. This is particularly important in the courtroom
where triers of fact rely upon the total message. Interpreters, therefore,
need to convey the paralinguistic aspects of communication manifested
by the non-English speaker as well as conveying the words themselves.
In a manual for court interpreters prepared by the Administrative Office
of the Courts in New Mexico, the point is made as follows:
Triers of fact (juries) need to have a clear understanding
of the emotions such as anger, fear, shame, or excite-
ment that are expressed by witnesses. Humans convey
their emotions not only in words, but also in facial ex-
pressions, posture, tone of voice, and other manifesta-
tions. These non-linguistic means of expression are very
closely tied to culture and language, so when people
don't speak the same language they may misunderstand
the emotional content of a message. The court interpreter
has an obligation to convey emotions in a way that
seems natural in the target language, rather than merely
repeating words like an automaton.32
Because of the importance of accuracy to the triers of fact, any inac-
curate interpretation, particularly during criminal proceedings, can create
constitutional issues leading to reversal. 33 One area of common concern
30 GONZALEZ Er AL., supra note 21, at 479-80.
31 Confronted with testimony that does not make sense, New Mexico advises:
It is particularly difficult to interpret the testimony of a person who is highly excited
or has mental problems and does not necessarily make sense. It is important for the
interpreter to make every effort to state exactly what the witness said, no matter how
illogical or irrelevant it may be.
NEw MEXICO MANUAL, supra note 25, pt. 3, at 3.
32 Id.
33 Inaccurate interpretation, like no interpretation at all, has vital importance in determin-
ing whether a non-English speaking defendant has been denied due process. The California
Court of Appeal in People v. Menchaca, 194 Cal. Rptr. 691, 694 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) set out
[Vol. 6:645
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relates to unrecorded conversations between the witness and the inter-
preter. The duty of the interpreter is "to ensure that the official record of
the proceedings in English reflects precisely what was stated by the non-
English speaking witness or defendant in another language ....- 4 The
record will not reflect this if the interpreter is drawn into an exchange
with the witness that is not interpreted into the target language. 35 Where
such an incomplete record results in a conviction, the defendant can raise
the argument that he was denied the right to due process. For instance, in
People v. Starling,36 the Appellate Court of illinois reversed a conviction
and ordered a new trial in a case where the interpreter regularly engaged
in unrecorded conversation with the complaining witness while that wit-
ness was on the stand.37 "Due process rights of persons charged with
crimes cannot be short-cut by avoiding the ritual of translating each
question and answer as required [by law]. '38
the constitutional problem raised by inaccurate or inadequate interpretation by quoting at
length from the decision by the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Rios, 539 P.2d 900 (1975):
A defendant's inability to spontaneously understand testimony being given would
undoubtedly limit his attorney's effectiveness, especially on cross-examination. It
would be as though a defendant were forced to observe the proceedings from a
soundproof booth or seated out of hearing at the rear of the courtroom, being able to
observe but not comprehend the criminal processes whereby the state had put his
freedom in jeopardy. Such a trial comes close to being an invective against an insen-
sible object, possibly infringing upon the accused's basic "right to be present in the
courtroom at every stage of his trial."
Id. at 901 (citing State v. Natividad, 526 P.2d 730, 733 (1974)).
34 JUDICIAL COUNCIL.. OF CALIFORNIA, PRoFEssIoNAL ETHics & THE ROLE OF THE COURT
ITERPRETER 2 (1994) [hereinafter CALIFoPI~mA COMMENTARY]; see also MINNESOTA CODE,
supra note 18, Canon 1 (Commentary); OREGON CODE, supra note 18, § 1 (Commentary);
MODEL GurDEs, supra note 11, at 200. Roseann Duenas Gonzlez et al. make the same point
as follows: "For the court interpreter, protecting the record is accomplished through disci-
plined and rigorous attention to transferring the conceptual message and style from the SL
(source language) to the TL (target language)." GONZALEZ Er AL., supra note 21, at 17.
35 Because interpreters are often the only persons in an official capacity who speak the
language of the non-English-speaking witness, the witness will at times feel a special bond
with the interpreter. This can lead to attempts by the witness to seek advice, ask questions, and
engage in other conversation with the interpreter that is not responsive to the question put by
counsel. To protect against such exchanges, the Massachusetts Code states that "[tihe non-
English speaker shall be instructed not to ask direct questions of the court interpreter or initiate
any independent dialogue with said interpreter including legal advice or explanations on any
statement made during the proceedings." MAsSAcHUsETrs CODE, supra note 18, §
1.03(6)(c)(2).
36 315 N.E.2d 163, 168 (1974).
37 The bounds of the interpreter's role are defined by the various codes. Consistent with
the instruction to be given to a witness as noted in the Massachusetts Code, supra note 35, the
scope of the interpreter's practice is only to ensure an accurate interpretation. The commen-
tary to the Model Guides wams that interpreters "should refrain from initiating communica-
tions while interpreting unless it is necessary for assuring an accurate and faithful
interpretation." MODEL Gumns, supra note 11, at 206.
38 315 N.E.2d 163, 168 (1974).
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In a subsequent case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
provided the following guidelines for interpreters regarding interpreter-
witness exchanges:
1. Counsel should address his questions to the witness in
the second person, and not to the interpreter.
2. The interpreter should translate the question exactly
without any additional or supplementary remarks of his
own.
3. The interpreter should then translate the answer of the
witness in the first person, neither editing nor adding to
the witness's words. Even if the answer is nonrespon-
sive, the interpreter should give it and allow the judge to
pass on its admissibility, for the interpreter's sole func-
tion is to translate.39
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that "the general standard for
adequate translation of trial proceedings requires continuous word for
word translation of everything relating to the trial a defendant conversant
in English would be privy to hear."'40
As an adjunct to the accuracy standard, all the codes of professional
responsibility require practicing interpreters to maintain and improve
their skills through continuing education. 41 More will be said about edu-
cation later, but it is important at this point to affirm the connection be-
tween accuracy and professional training.
B. HoNEsTY
While accuracy as a standard addresses the interpreter's skill and
ability to facilitate communication, the second professional standard of
practice, honesty, relates directly to the interpreter's personal integrity.
Three specific obligations appear in the various state codes under this
standard. First, interpreters are required to represent honestly to the
court their "certifications, training, and pertinent experience. '42 It is then
39 Commonwealth v. Festa, 341 N.E.2d 276, 283 (1976).
40 United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 1990). The court added, how-
ever, that "occasional lapses" from the standard will not usually render the trial fundamentally
unfair. Id.
41 "A court interpreter should, through continuing education, maintain and improve his
or her interpreting skills and knowledge of procedures used by the courts." See, e.g., HAWAII
CODE, supra note 18, at Rule 15; CALIFORNIA CODE, supra note 18, at f; MASSACHUSETrS
CODE, supra note 18, § 1.03(4)(a); MINNESOTA CODE, supra note 18, Canon 10; NEw JERSEY
CODE, supra note 18, Canon 9; NEw MExIco CODE, supra note 18, Canon 10; OREGON CODE,
supra note 18, § 11.
42 See MINNESOTA CODE, supra note 18, Canon 2; HAwAu CODE, supra note 18, Rule
10; NEw JERSEY CODE, supra note 18, Canon 8; NEw MExico CODE, supra note 18, Canon 2;
OREGON CODE, supra note 18, § 2.
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within the discretion of the court to accept or reject the qualifications of
the interpreter to interpret during the proceedings. 43 Upon presentment,
the interpreter implicitly conveys to the court that he has the requisite
skill to provide accurate interpreting services. 44 It is disruptive and
costly to the judicial process when, after having accepted a case, an inter-
preter is incapable of interpreting the proceedings. This can happen
readily, even to experienced interpreters, for instance, if they have not
developed the technical vocabulary necessary to the case at hand.45
Thus, while the honesty standard requires a true representation of one's
credentials, it also requires that the interpreter report to the presiding
officer any impediment to the interpreter's delivery of services occurring
after the proceedings have begun.46
This second aspect of the honesty standard, "assessing and reporting
impediments to performance," further requires that the interpreter dis-
close "any personal bias he or she may have involving any aspect of the
43 In all states, the appointment of an interpreter falls within the discretion of the trial
judge. The power of appointment is most commonly recognized by statute or court rule. See,
e.g., ALAsKA R. EvlD. 604; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-104(c) (Michie 1995); MINN. GmN. R.
PRAc. § 8.02; V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 323 (West 1994). This discretionary power of appoint-
ment is coupled with the discretionary power to accept or reject the qualifications of the inter-
preter. Commonwealth v. Salim, 503 N.E.2d 1267, 1274 (Mass. 1987) (holding that "the
qualifications of an interpreter fall within the area of the judge's discretion"); see generally
MODEL GuIDEs, supra note 11, at 125-146 (setting out the judges' guide to standards for
interpreted proceedings). In states that have placed the authority to certify interpreters in ad-
ministrative bodies, interpreters present themselves to the court presumptively qualified.
Charles M. Grabau, Court Interpretation Services in The Massachusetts Trial Courts: One
Step Fonvard, Two Steps Back, BosToN B.J., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 4. However, even a pre-
sumptively qualified interpreter's accuracy can be challenged and his interpretation set aside
during trial if the judge determines that the interpreter's error is substantial or prejudicial. It is
ultimately within the court's discretion to determine as to the correct interpretation. MODEL
Gum Es, supra note 11, at 136-137.
44 "Acceptance of a case by an interpreter conveys linguistic competency in legal set-
tings." MINNESOTA CODE, supra note 18, Canon 2 (Commentary); OREGON CODE, supra note
18, § 2 (Commentary); MODEL GuIDES, supra note 11, at 201.
45 For interpreters caught in this situation, several codes advise as follows: "Even com-
petent and experienced interpreters may encounter situations where routine proceedings sud-
denly involve technical or specialized terminology unfamiliar to the interpreter, e.g., the
unscheduled testimony of an expert witness. When such situations occur, interpreters should
request a brief recess in order to familiarize themselves with the subject matter." MINNESOTA
CODE, supra note 18, Canon 8 (Commentary); OREGON CODE, supra note 18, § 9 (Commen-
tary); MODEL GUIDES, supra note 11, at 208.
46 "Interpreters shall call to the attention of the court any factors or conditions that ad-
versely affect their ability to perform adequately." HAWAII CODE, supra note 18, Rule 10.
Factors that can adversely affect the interpreter's ability to perform range from unfamiliarity
with terms to environmental factors within the courtroom, fatigue, inadequate preparation, and
difficulty in understanding a witness. See generally MINNESOTA CODE, supra note 18, Canon
8 (Commentary); OREGON CODE, supra note 18, § 9 (Commentary); MODEL GuIDEs, supra
note 11, at 207-209.
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proceedings.. . ."47 Because interpreters are bound to "act strictly in the
interests of the court they serve, '48 the court is their client. Avoiding
bias obligates an interpreter to be neutral, to serve the interests of the
court by not taking sides or prejudging the case. For instance, the New
Mexico interpreter manual instructs the interpreter regarding neutrality as
follows:
Furthermore, you must not make value judgments about
the language or demeanor of the parties you interpret for.
If the witness uses incorrect grammar or vulgar speech,
or if he wears inappropriate dress, you should interpret
his or her testimony just as faithfully as you would that
of any other witness. You should not, for example, roll
your eyes or use a sarcastic tone to convey to others that
you consider the testimony improper or untruthful.49
The third aspect of the honesty standard compels the interpreter to
"report to the court any actions by any persons that may impede the in-
terpreter's compliance with any law, any provision of [the code of pro-
fessional responsibility] or any other official policy governing court
interpreting and sight translating."50 For instance, if a non-English
speaking witness asks the interpreter for legal advice, the interpreter
must explain that he cannot give it; if the witness persists, the interpreter
must inform the court of the witness's entreaties. 51
47 See OREGON CODE, supra note 18, § 9 (Commentary); CALIORNIA COMMENTARY,
supra note 34, at 17; HAWAII CODE, supra note 18, Rule 5; MASSACHUSETrS CODE, supra note
18, § 1.04(3)(a),(c),(e),(f); NEW JERSEY CODE, supra note 18, Canon 3; WASHINGTON CODE,
supra note 18, d.
48 HAWAII CODE, supra note 18, Rule 1. Acting in the interests of the court that they
serve, interpreters are designated as officers of the court in California, see CALIFORNIA COM-
MENTARY, supra note 34, at 27, and Minnesota, see MINNESOTA CODE, supra note 18, Canon 3
(Commentary), and admonished to "promote public confidence in the administration of jus-
tice" in New Jersey, see NEW JERSEY CODE, supra note 18, Canon 1.
49 NEW MExico MANuAL, supra note 25, pt. 3, at 7.
50 OREGON CODE, supra note 18, § 10. Accord HAWAII CODE, supra note 18, Rule 16;
MASSACHUSETTS CODE, supra note 18, § 1.05(1); MINNESOTA CODE, supra note 18, Canon 9;
NEW JERSEY CODE, supra note 18, Canon 10; WASHINGTON CODE, supra note 18, f.
51 All of the codes are clear that interpreters must not give legal advice. See, e.g., CALI-
FORNIA CODE, supra note 18, d; HAWAII CODE, supra note 18, Rule 9. Situations may arise,
however, that pose legitimate dilemmas, as the New Mexico Manual explains:
It is clear, then, that the court interpreter should refrain from usurping the role of the
attorney. Nonetheless, the situation is not always clear cut; defendants often ask
interpreters questions about the proceedings during breaks, or even in open court. If
the defendant is speaking on the record, of course, you must simply interpret the
question into English. But questions asked off the record pose a subtler dilemma.
Sometimes there is a fine line between practicing law and defining words in linguis-
tic terms, or simply giving information that a lay person might dispense.
New Mexico Manual, supra note 25, pt. 3, at 8-9.
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C. PROFESSIONALISM
The third standard of practice for interpreters is professionalism. In
this category are the interpreter's duty to avoid conflicts of interest,5 2
maintain confidentiality and avoid public comment,5 3 and maintain a
professional demeanor.54 Each of these aspects of the professionalism
standard speaks to the role of the interpreter in the courtroom.55 Gonz-
lez states the matter simply: "The interpreter shall confine himself or
herself to the role of interpreting.156 Further, it is not the role of inter-
preters to comment on the proceedings, divulge privileged information
(such as conversations between attorney and client), or deliver interpret-
ing services in a manner that calls attention to themselves by their de-
meanor or dress. 57
One thicket that can present great obstacles to the interpreter is a
conflict of interest. As the commentary of the NCSC's Model Code of
Professional Responsibility advises: "The interpreter serves as an officer
of the court and the interpreter's duty in a court proceeding is to serve the
court and the public to which the court is a servant."58 A conflict of
interest, as with interpreter bias, compromises this duty to the court.
Even the appearance of a conflict of interest may raise serious questions
in the public forum about the integrity of the judicial process itself. As a
52 CALIFORNIA CODE, supra note 18, b; HAWAII CODE, supra note 18, Rule 5; MASSA-
cHusErrs CODE, supra note 18, § 1.04(3); MINNESOTA CODE, supra note 18, Canon 3; NEW.
JERSEY CODE, supra note 18, Canon 3; OREGON CODE, supra note 18, § 3.
53 CALIFORNIA CODE, supra note 18, c; HAWAII CODE, supra note 18, Rule 4; MASSA-
CHuSErrs CODE; supra note 18, § 1.03(3); MINNESOTA CODE, supra note 18, Canons 5-6; NEw
JERSEY CODE, supra note 18, Canons 6-7; OREGON CODE, supra note 18, §§ 6-7; WASHINGTON
CODE, supra note 18, e.
54 Maintaining a professional demeanor requires interpreters to observe the established
protocol for the delivery of interpreter services, to dress in a manner appropriate to the court,
to speak so as to be heard throughout the courtroom, and otherwise to be unobtrusive. See
CALIFORNIA COMMENTARY, supra note 34, at 27-28;HAwAE CODE, supra note 18, Rules 2, 6;
MASSACHUSETrS CODE, supra note 18, § 1.03(5); MINNESOTA CODE, supra note 18, Canon 4;
NEW JERSEY CODE, supra note 18, Canon 4; NEW MEXICo CODE, supra note 18, Canon 4;
OREGON CODE, supra note 18, Canon 5.
55 "There are two basic reasons for having an interpreter present-in a court case: to
enable the defendant to understand the proceedings, and to enable the court to understand all
non-English speakers who address the court." NEw MExco MANUAL, supra note 25, pt. 3, at
7. See also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
56 GoNzALEz ET AL., supra note 21, at 500.
57 The issues raised here relate to the level of professional detachment required of an
interpreter. The New Mexico Manual instructs as follows:
As an interpreter, you must be mindful at all times that communication is the pri-
mary objective of the interpretation process. You are not there to show off your
knowledge or to impress people with your abilities .... While it is important for
your to establish a rapport with the people you are interpreting for, you should not
become too involved with them.
NEw MExIco MANUAL, supra note 25, pt. 3, at 9; see also supra text accompanying note 54.
58 MODEL GurDEs, supra note 11, at 202; see also supra text accompanying note 48.
658 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
guide, the NCSC's model code provides examples of circumstances that
are presumed to create an actual or apparent conflict. 59
The area of conflict of interest that seems to have raised the most
issues on appeal relates to persons acting as interpreters for competing
parties in the same criminal proceeding. These parties may be prosecu-
tion and defendant, complaining witness and defendant, or co-defend-
ants. For instance, in People v. Menchaca,60 the California Court of
Appeal ruled that a criminal defendant is denied due process when a
court fails to provide him with his own interpreter separate from the in-
terpreter used by the court for the witnesses. The court stated, ".... a
third party witness interpreter cannot effectively discharge the translating
responsibilities owed to the defendant."'61 Further, a Massachusetts case,
Commonwealth v. Delrio,62 provided an interesting twist on this theme:
one defendant was allowed to interpret his co-defendant's pre-Miranda
admission. After the conviction of the co-defendant, the co-defendant
appealed on the ground that the interpreting defendant was not "an indif-
ferent interpreter" and may have slanted or misrepresented the co-de-
fendant's statement to his own advantage. 63 On this and related grounds,
the Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed the conviction. 64
Potential conflicts of interest and the other issues raised by the pro-
fessional standards of practice for interpreters form a convenient starting
point for discussing the basic elements of a viable training program in
court interpretation. Indeed, the standards of accuracy, honesty, and pro-
fessionalism set the objectives of any interpreter training curriculum.
59 The Model Code provides:
The following are circumstances that are presumed to create actual or apparent con-
flicts of interest... :
1. The interpreter is a friend, associate, or relative of a party or counsel for a party
involved in the proceedings;
2. The interpreter has served in an investigative capacity for any party involved in
the case;
3. The interpreter has previously been retained by a law enforcement agency to
assist in the preparation of the criminal case at issue;
4. The interpreter or the interpreter's spouse or child has a financial interest in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest
that would be affected by the outcome of the case;
5. The interpreter has been involved in the choice of counsel or law firm for that
case.
MODEL GUIDES, supra note 11, at 203-204.
60 194 Cal. Rptr. 691 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
61 Id. at 694.
62 497 N.E.2d 1097 (1986).
63 Id. at 1100.
64 Id. at 1103.
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III. CURRICULUM GUIDELINES FOR COURT
INTERPRETER TRAINING
From what has already been said, it should be clear that court inter-
preter education is not legal education, nor is it language education.
Rather, while incorporating elements of law and language, interpreter ed-
ucation is fundamentally a program to train individuals in utilizing com-
munication skills in a manner consistent with the duty owed by
interpreters to the court. In 1988, T. Edward Hollander, Chancellor of
Higher Education for New Jersey during that state's innovative Project
on Legal Interpretation, wrote:
Contrary to popular belief, interpreter education is not
foreign language centered since the mastery of at least
two active languages at [or] near native level of profi-
ciency is a prerequisite for work and/or study in the
field. Interpreter education is, by definition, a multi-
and inter-disciplinary endeavor which centers around the
mastery of communication-based tasks.65
Training in these communication-based tasks became the center of
the Curricular Guidelines for the Development of Legal Interpreter Edu-
cation written by the New Jersey Consortium in Legal Interpretation and
Translation (hereinafter New Jersey Guidelines). 66
The focus of the training under the New Jersey Guidelines is skill
development in translation, consecutive interpretation, and simultaneous
interpretation. These are the primary tasks that court interpreters are
asked to perform. 67 The Federal Court Interpreter Certification Exami-
nation Manual confirms the centrality of these tasks. 68 The manual ad-
65 NEW JERSEY CONSORTIUM OF EDUCATORS IN LEGAL INTERPRETATION & TRANsLA-
TION, CURRICULAR GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INTERPRETER EDUCATION,
app. at 10 (1988) [hereinafter NEw JERSEY GUIDELINES].
66 As stated in the preface to the guidelines, the objective of the New Jersey Consortium
is:
to develop comprehensive academic programs to meet the immediate and long-range
needs of the Judiciary: to provide currently practicing bilingual interpreters with
educational opportunities which have never before existed as well as to produce a
cadre of highly skilled professionals to meet the future needs of the State's linguistic
minorities.
Id. at ii.
67 The tasks of consecutive and simultaneous interpretation are set out in the Court Inter-
preters Act of 1978, § 1827(k), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 602-04, 1827-28 (1996) and the Court Inter-
preter Amendments Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. § I nt. (1996). See also MAssAcHUsETTs CODE,
supra note 18, § 1.03(8)(a)(b) (distinguishing the circumstances when simultaneous and con-
secutive interpretation modes should be employed).
68 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, THE FEDERAL COURT INTER-
PRETER CERTIFICATION EXAMINATION MANUAL (SPAMISH/ENGLISH) 5, 31-32 (1994-1996)
[hereinafter FEDERAL MANUAL].
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vises examinees that the federal interpreter "oral examination is a
criterion-referenced test of the three interpretation modes most com-
monly required in federal court: sight translation, consecutive interpreta-
tion, and simultaneous interpretation." 69 A brief description of each of
these tasks follows.
A. SIGHT TRANSLATION
Sight translation is the oral rendering of a written text.70 "Here the
court interpreter must bring to bear the requisite knowledge of the writ-
ten word which characterizes the work of the legal translator, but must
carry out the translation with the same rapidity of response which is re-
quired of court interpretation. ' 71 This requirement to translate a legal
document or form upon sight can arise at any stage of the legal process.
The federal interpreter examination tests sight translation skills by utiliz-
ing notarized statements, laws, simulated probation reports, presentence
reports, and depositions. 72 Similarly, for training individuals in sight
translation, the New Mexico manual for court interpreters reproduces
sample criminal complaints, a waiver of appearance, a criminal sum-
mons, and a bench warrant, among others.7 3
B. CONSECUTIVE INTERPRETATION
Consecutive interpretation is "the interpretation of a statement from
one language into another after the speaker has finished the communica-
tion."74 This communication skill is most commonly utilized to interpret
a witness's testimony for the court.75 Because consecutive interpretation
requires that the interpreter remember what has been said over a period
of several minutes before delivering it into the target language, listening
69 Id. at 28.
70 "Sight translation refers to orally interpreting a written document into another lan-
guage." OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE COURTS, STATE OF WASHINGTON, COURT
INTERPRETER ADVISORY COMMrITEE INTERIM REPORT 2 (1990) [hereinafter WASHINGTON IN-
TERIM REPORT]. For a general discussion of sight translation, see GONZALEZ ET AL., supra
note 21, at 401-11.
71 NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON INTERPRETER & TRANSLATION SERV-
ICES, EQUAL ACCESS TO THE COURTS FOR LINGUISTIC MINORITIES 64 (1985) [hereinafter NEw
JERSEY TASK FORCE].
72 FEDERAL MANUAL, supra note 68, at 28.
73 NEw MExIco MANUAL, supra note 25, pt. 5.
74 WASHINGTON INTERIM REPORT, supra note 70, at 2.
75 Id. See also MASSACHUSETTS CODE, supra note 18, § 1.03(8)(b) (indicating that the
consecutive mode is used when non-English speakers are giving testimony or when the judge,
counsel, or officer of the court is in direct dialogue with such speaker); MODEL GUIDES, supra
note 11, at 34 (stating that witness interpreting is conducted in the consecutive mode). For a
general discussion of consecutive interpretation, see GONZALEZ ET AL., supra note 21, at 379-
400.
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is crucial to accuracy.76  As part of interpreter training in consecutive
interpretation, instruction in note-taking77 and memory78 is important.
Sometimes, to assist in accurately rendering long narrative testimony into
the target language, the interpreter may have to signal the witness to
pause in order to allow for the interpretation. 79 Part of one's training in
consecutive interpretation must include instruction in how an interpreter
should approach this and other similar types of direct interaction with a
witness. 80
C. SIMULTANEOUS INTERPRETATION
Simultaneous interpretation is "the interpretation of a statement vir-
tually immediately after it is spoken .... -81 It is rendered by the inter-
preter while the speaker continues to speak. For most simultaneous
interpretation, the interpreter speaks in whispered tones intended to be
heard only by the one receiving the interpretation.82 For example, an
ifiterpreter during a trial uses the simultaneous mode when sitting at the
defense table with a non-English speaking defendant and interprets testi-
mony that is being given in English into the language of the defendant.
The simultaneous mode may also be used at the time of arrest, upon the
reading of the Miranda warnings. 83 In many states, where warnings have
become quite elaborate, the interpreter plays a crucial role by simultane-
ously rendering the warnings into the target language. Practicing the
warnings can be a very useful training exercise in simultaneous
interpreting.84
These three communication tasks-sight translation, consecutive in-
terpretation, and simultaneous interpretation-form the core of the inter-
76 See generally GONZALEZ ET AL., supra note 21, at 380-81 (indicating that because it
taxes a bilingual person's memory more heavily to remember something said in their non-
native language, interpreters need to develop the most deliberate and alert form of listening
called "attending" listening).
77 See generally id. at 392-95 (advising court interpreters to take only notes that are
needed, to abbreviate, and to use pictures, diagrams, and relative positions on the page).
78 See generally id. at 382-86 (emphasizing the vital role of memory in consecutive inter-
pretation and strategies that interpreters can utilize to improve retention).
79 See generally id. at 392 (indicating that, confronted with lengthy testimony, the inter-
preter must intervene when he knows that he cannot retain any more of the witness's state-
ment); NEw JERSEY TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 62 (recommending that interpreters employ
hand signals to encourage witnesses to pause so as to allow the interpreter to render the
interpretation).
80 GonzAlez warns that situational control by the interpreter should be exerted "in limited
situations, and only rarely ...." GONZALEZ Er AL., supra note 21, at 395.
81 WASHiN rON INTERIM REPORT, supra note 70, at 2 (emphasis omitted). For a general
discussion of simultaneous interpretation, see GONZAL Er AL., supra note 21, at 359-78.
82 MODEL GuIDES, supra note 11, at 34.
83 Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
84 The New Mexico Manual sets out an expanded version of the Miranda warnings as a
simultaneous interpreting exercise. NEw MExico MAuAL, supra note 25, pt. 5.
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preter's practice. These tasks, in addition to instruction in the workings
of the legal system and the interpreter's ethical and professional respon-
sibility to that system, are the center points around which an interpreter
training curriculum should turn. 85
The burden of designing such a curriculum has been lightened sig-
nificantly by the issuance of the New Jersey Guidelines.86 These guide-
lines include a design for court interpreter instruction that encompasses
programs leading to an undergraduate degree, a post-baccalaureate pro-
fessional certificate, and a graduate degree. Before reviewing the guide-
lines, it should be noted that the New Jersey effort constitutes the most
complete study and plan for implementing a college-level court inter-
preter curriculum so far undertaken in the United States.
The first question addressed by the New Jersey Guidelines is what
is a professional interpreter. The six-part definition holds that a profes-
sional interpreter is one who has: complete fluency in two languages;
developed interpretation skills; a wide general knowledge; specialized
knowledge in a given field (the legal system for court interpreters); bicul-
tural sensitivity; and a sense of professionalism. 87 Because this article
has already addressed some issues related to skills, specialized knowl-
edge, and professionalism, the following discussion will be limited to the
other three parts of the definition-fluency in two languages, general
knowledge, and bicultural sensitivity-and their relation to the accuracy
standard for interpreters.
Complete fluency in two languages is a sine qua non of accurate
interpretation. 88 The New Jersey Guidelines caution, however, that such
fluency requires more than simply being able to read, speak, and write
two languages. It also encompasses "familiarity with slang, regional-
isms, colloquialisms, dialectical variations, and specialized vocabu-
85 The Washington Court Interpreter Advisory Committee summarizes the skills to be
tested for certifying interpreters: vocabulary and grammar, bilingual fluency, simultaneous
and consecutive interpretation, cultural awareness, knowledge of legal procedure, ethics, and
interpersonal skills, among others. WASHINGTON INTERIM REPORT, supra note 70, at 15-17.
86 See source cited supra note 65.
87 Id. at 2-3. The New Jersey definition compares favorably with the Washington sum-
mary of "skills to be tested" for certifying interpreters; see supra note 85 and accompanying
text. Also, the job specifications for an entry level court interpreter as outlined by the NCSC
incorporate all of the elements of the New Jersey definition with the exception of the "wide
general knowledge" criterion. See MODEL GUoES, supra note 11, at 48.
88 Explaining that linguistic considerations are primary for court interpreters, the New
Jersey Supreme Court Task Force wrote:
It is not enough merely to be bilingual. Rather a court interpreter must be able to
speak both English and the second language at a certain level of proficiency. Even
so, being bilingual is only the starting point. The skills of the professional court
interpreter involve much more than a simple process of providing semantic
equivalence.
NEw JERSEY TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 61 (citation omitted).
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lary."8 9  These are echoed by the NCSC guidelines, which hold
interpreters to knowledge of "phonology, vocabulary, grammar and dia-
lectology" in two languages. 90
Linked to this expansive view of bilingual fluency is bicultural sen-
sitivity. Since interpretation entails communication across cultures as
well as languages, accurate interpretation requires that interpreters under-
stand "differences in gestures, reactions, attitudes towards time, [and]
forms of personal address." 91 The Massachusetts Code of Professional
Conduct for Court Interpreters of the Trial Court refers to this capacity
as "cultural fluency" and calls for "awareness and full comprehension of
cross-cultural factors including but not limited to, expectations, attitudes,
values, roles, institutions .... -92 On the issue of wide general knowl-
edge, interpreters, as do all professionals, must be able to call upon their
understanding of life and the world in the performance of their duties.
"One cannot interpret what one does not understand, and one cannot un-
derstand what one does not know. '93
After defining the abilities of a professional interpreter, the New
Jersey Guidelines propose "a two-level, multiple track educational pro-
gran ' 9 4 for interpreter training. The proposed program envisages both
an undergraduate pre-professional course of study leading to a minor in
legal interpretation 95 and a graduate level program leading to a profes-
sional certificate, diploma, or master's degree. At both levels, instruction
will need to take account of whether students are practicing or aspiring
interpreters. This will dictate the speed and rigor of the course of study.
The undergraduate minor outlined in the New Jersey Guidelines is
an eighteen to twenty-four credit module within a liberal arts bachelor
program. Instruction in the communication skills of translation and in-
terpretation, and a legal content course, presumably incorporating in-
89 NEw JERSEY GuIDELmEs, supra note 65, at 2.
90 MODEL GUIDES, supra note 11, at 48.
91 NEw JERSEY GUIDELINES, supra note 65, at 3. Stating that communication is cultural
as well as linguistic, the New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force noted: "Culture lays behind
words that are spoken and the norms, value systems and symbols of the culture shape the
meaning of those words. When persons from different cultures attempt to communicate, the
norms, value systems and symbols which shape the meaning of words they speak often differ."
NEw JERSEY TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 31.
92 MASSACHUSEITS CODE, supra note 18, § 1.02:
93 NEw JERSEY GUIDELINES, supra note 65, at 2.
94 Id. at 5.
95 In view of the New Jersey curriculum proposal to create a minor in "legal interpreta-
tion," it is appropriate to note that while the phrases "court interpretation" and "legal interpre-
tation" are at times used interchangeably, "court interpretation" applies more precisely to that
branch of legal interpretation that is practiced preparatory to and during judicial proceedings.
"Legal interpretation" is a more inclusive concept and relates broadly to interpretation in the
whole range of legal practice, e.g., administrative hearings, legal conferences, legal consulta-
tions, and other settings as well as during judicial proceedings.
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struction in the legal system and the standards of practice for court
interpreters, comprise fifteen of the credits. The remaining credits pro-
vide an opportunity for instruction in language, language-related, or cul-
ture-related courses. The minor is supplemented by the remainder of the
bachelor of arts curriculum, which accents study in the social sciences
and in communication and linguistics. 9 6 Currently, the only undergradu-
ate minor in legal interpretation in the United States is offered at William
Paterson College in New Jersey. There are no bachelor degree programs
in legal interpretation anywhere in the United States. 97
Under the New Jersey Guidelines, the graduate level course of study
is a forty-two credit program. It presumes that applicants will have al-
ready completed the interpretation minor on the undergraduate level or
will complete twelve credits in translation and interpretation during the
first semester of the graduate program before proceeding to the forty-two
credit master's core. The core includes intensive instruction in transla-
tion and interpretation as well as courses in public speaking and legal
process, and an interpreter internship. 98 Currently, the only master's de-
gree in legal interpretation is offered by the University of South Carolina
at Charleston. Its curriculum is generally reflective of the New Jersey
Guidelines. 99
The few remaining programs of study in legal interpretation in the
United States take the form of either sequenced programs often leading
to a professional certificate, or non-sequenced courses and workshops.
Some are credit, and some are non-credit programs. Most sequenced
programs provide a series of courses similar to the sequence outlined in
the New Jersey Guidelines. These include courses in translation, consec-
utive and simultaneous interpretation, and legal process and content. Se-
quenced programs generally range in length from 150 to 210 hours,
roughly the equivalent of fifteen to twenty-one credits or non-credit Con-
tinuing Education Units (CEUs).100
96 NEW JERSEY GUIDELINES, supra note 65, at 15-20.
97 This information on the state of undergraduate legal interpretation was confirmed in
telephone interviews conducted by the author in October 1996 with Virginia Benmaman, Di-
rector of the Master of Arts in Bilingual Legal Interpreting Program and a member of the
Project Advisory Committee for the NCSC MODEL GUIDES, see supra note 11, and with
Marilyn Tayler, Project Director of the New Jersey Legal Interpretation Project, which pre-
pared the NEW JERSEY GUIDELINES, see supra note 65, for legal interpreter education.
98 NEW JERSEY GUIDELINES, supra note 65, at 20-26.
99 UNIVERSITY OF CHARLESTON SOUTH CAROLINA, MASTER OF ARTS IN BILINGUAL
LEGAL INTERPRETING (1996). Georgetown University offers a program in interpretation and
translation that carries graduate credit, but the program is limited to conference interpreting
and leads only to a certificate of proficiency in translation. GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, INTER-
PRETATION AND TRANSLATION (1996).
100 A review of several sequenced-program brochures indicates programs of the length
noted: Bentley College (Massachusetts), 150 hours; New York University, 175 hours; Univer-
sity of Minnesota, 195 hours; Monterey Institute (California), 210 hours.
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A peripheral, yet important issue relating to curriculum guidelines is
the matter of admission standards. What criteria ought to be used in
admitting individuals to a legal interpreter program? The two criteria
central to the consideration of admission standards are bilingual fluency
and adequate prior education.
Regarding the former, there is no difference of opinion. As already
noted, legal interpreter education is not language education. Thus, every
educational program for interpreters expects that a student seeking ad-
mission be bilingual.'0 1 The New Jersey Guidelines call for screening
tests to measure bilingual ability. 10 2 While the formats of these bilingual
screening tests often vary from institution to institution, 0 3 the objective
of all of them is to assure that students who undertake instruction in
communication skills are not hobbled by an inability to speak the lan-
guages in which they seek to train. 1°4
As to the latter criterion, adequate prior education, there appears to
be a difference of view. The question is, what is "adequate?" The New
Jersey Guidelines indicate that "[a] comprehensive professional legal in-
terpretation program should be offered at the graduate level to allow stu-
dents the time and opportunity at the undergraduate level to develop their
general knowledge."' 1 5 This reliance upon undergraduate study to pro-
vide the necessary level of general knowledge is reflected in the policies
of some states that require certification of interpreters. For instance, in
Massachusetts, the Office of Court Interpreter Services will not certify an
interpreter who does not already have a bachelor's degree.' 0 6
101 The University of Minnesota is typical of other programs in this regard. Its program
flyer states: "Applicants are expected to already possess native-like proficiency in both lan-
guages in which they plan to interpret." UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, DEVELOP PROFESSIONAL
INTRPRETING AND TRANSLATION SKILLS (1995).
102 NEW JERSEY GuIDELINEs, supra note 65, at 7.
103 For example, the respective program brochures indicate that New York University
requires applicants entering its Certificate in Court Interpreting program to pass an oral exam,
which takes the form of a fifteen-minute telephone interview; Bentley College requires a sev-
enty-minute exam consisting of a written translation section from English to Spanish and vice
versa and an oral "shadowing" exercise. For a discussion of shadowing as a testing tool, see
Georganne Weller & Javier Lopez, Shadowing Exercises as an Evaluation Criterion of En-
trance Examinations for Conference Interpretation Programs, LOOKING AHEAD: PROC. 31
ANN. CoNF. Am. TRANSLATORS ASS'N 67 (1990).
104 One aspect of all legal interpreting programs is to assist students in developing their
specialized legal vocabularies. While students must be bilingual at the outset of their studies,
there is no expectation that students bring to their studies an already-developed technical
vocabulary.
105 NEw JERSEY GumELmms, supra note 65, at 7. The legal interpretation sequence of
courses offered at William Paterson College (New Jersey) is an undergraduate "minor." It is
considered "pre-professional" consistent with the New Jersey Guidelines. Id. at 15-20.
106 The bachelor's degree requirement was confirmed in an interview conducted by the
author on August 23, 1995 with Maribel Pintado-Espiet, Coordinator of the Office of Court
Interpreter Services of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
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The admissions practices of the educational institutions offering
programs in legal interpretation, however, do not adhere uniformly to
this second criterion. 107 This may be attributable to a difference in opin-
ion regarding whether possession of a bachelor's degree is the only valid
measure of the level of wide-ranging knowledge needed to act effectively
as an interpreter. In 1990, the Office of the Administrator for the Courts
in the State of Washington recommended that "no education or experi-
ence prerequisites should be required" to sit for the certification exami-
nation and be certified as a court interpreter. 10 8 The reason given for this
recommendation is that practicing interpreters in Washington have vary-
ing educational backgrounds and that requiring prerequisites might elimi-
nate otherwise qualified interpreters. 109
As is often the case, the two views on this issue reflect the tension
between the ideal and the pragmatic. Clearly, a four-year undergraduate
degree program does provide the time and opportunity for individuals to
develop their minds and expand their understanding of the world around
them. Ideally, an undergraduate degree ought to be an admission crite-
rion. The reality is, however, that there is a shortage of interpreters.' 10
States like Washington have come to rely upon interpreters without for-
mal education, but whose life experience has proven invaluable to the
delivery of interpreter services. Some of these interpreters have lived
and worked in two cultural environments and thereby have developed an
understanding of the world around them that should not be invalidated by
the rigid application of an academic standard. The ability of those who
do not hold bachelor's degrees to become proficient interpreters is recog-
nized also by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
which states in its 'examination manual for interpreters that "no formal
educational requirements" need be met to be eligible for certification as a
federal interpreter.' The differences in opinion relating to this issue
will be resolved as interpreter education matures. The ultimate solution
will likely be premised upon the need for flexibility in assessing an aspir-
ing interpreter's range of general knowledge. Undergraduate study, or
life and work experience, or some combination of the two coupled with
passing a state or federal certification examination might best serve the
107 With the exception of the interpreter programs at the University of Charleston South
Carolina and Georgetown University, both of which offer graduate level credit, court interpret-
ing programs generally do not require a bachelor's degree as an admission criteria. This is
confirmed in the program brochures of the following institutions: Bentley College (Massachu-
setts), Monterey Institute (California), University of Minnesota, and New York University.
108 WASHINGTON INTERIM REPORT, supra note 70, at 17.
109 Id.
110 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
111 FEDERAL MANuAL, supra note 68, at 6.
COURT hITERPRETERS
objective of providing an adequate pool of qualified interpreters to meet
the needs of the courts.
IV. ISSUES FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES SEEKING TO
IMPLEMENT COURT INTERPRETER TRAINING
From the foregoing discussion regarding curriculum guidelines, it
should be clear that colleges and universities ought to and will play a
significant and expanding role in interpreter training. The debate over
requiring a bachelor's degree aside, no one would deny the value of an
undergraduate education in any of life's endeavors. Further, the need for
focused instruction in the communication skills of consecutive and si-
multaneous interpretation and sight translation can best be met by institu-
tions that are established and structured to teach. Of course, as colleges
and universities move into the field of court interpreter education, a
number of issues will need to be addressed. Although not predictive of
the range of those issues, there are three that almost immediately will
confront any college or university entering the field of court interpreter
training. These issues are the relationship between the academic institu-
tion and the court, the costs of an interpreter training program, and the
recruitment of qualified faculty.
Regarding the relationship between the academic institution and the
court, the main issue is one of coordination. In short, who trains and
who certifies? In several states requiring that interpreters be certified
before engaging in courtroom practice, the distinction between the train-
ing of interpreters and their certification is clearly delineated so that, as
one might expect, the academic institutions train and the courts certify.
For instance, in the State of Washington, by statute,1 12 the function of
certification is placed in the office of the administrator of the courts and
the function of training is given over to academic institutions working
cooperatively with the administrator.
Under the Washington certification regime, it is the court adminis-
trative office that is authorized to "establish and administer a comprehen-
sive testing and certification program for language interpreters."'" 3 This
responsibility of the courts in Washington to certify interpreters, who
then assume roles as officers of the court,' 14 is consistent with the prac-
112 WASH. REv. CODE § 2.43.070(l)(2) (1989).
113 Id. at (1). The importance of placing the authority to certify court interpreters in a
public entity is "to protect the public interest." NEw JERSEY TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at
179.
114 The Washington Code, supra note 18, a, refers to a court interpreter as being "like
an officer of the court." Other codes are more emphatic in stating that interpreters are officers
of the court. See, e.g., Cm.woRNm CoMnmNARY, supra note 34, at 27; MINNESOTA CODE,
supra note 18, Canon 3 (Commentary); NEw M xico CODE, supra note 18, pream.; MODEL
GuxDEs, supra note 11, pream.
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tice of courts generally in certifying or licensing those who practice
before the bar as lawyers. It is and should be the responsibility of the
courts to certify court officers. Even in those states that have not yet
established a formal process for certifying interpreters within the admin-
istrative office of the courts, the responsibility for deciding whether an
interpreter is to function in the courtroom remains a responsibility of the
judicial department. 115
Regarding training, however, the role of the judiciary is secondary.
The Washington statute parallels the New Jersey recommendation1 16 that
the courts should work cooperatively with institutions of higher educa-
tion to develop an interpreter training curriculum and should designate
several of those institutions to conduct the training. 117 Reinforcing this
point are the guidelines prepared by the National Center for State Courts,
which recognize that the courts are not equipped to prepare and establish
long-term, formalized programs for court interpreter education. 18 Thus,
colleges and universities must fulfill this function. This division of re-
sponsibility is logical and efficient. The task for colleges and universi-
ties, then, is to coordinate their efforts in preparing court interpreter
115 Both the selection and appointment of an interpreter is a judicial function. Regarding
the selection of an interpreter in those states without a formal certification process, the services
of an interpreter are often enlisted by the court clerk or another court interpreter. The practice
of those New England states that do not have formal certification is instructive. In New
Hampshire and Vermont, a list of possible interpreters is compiled by court administrative
personnel in Concord and Montpelier, respectively, and distributed to clerks of court in those
states. The names are often compiled from other listings by private agencies in those states.
In Maine, like New Hampshire and Vermont, the clerks of court select interpreters from a list,
but the list is compiled by the clerk herself. In Portland, the clerk often relies upon the Greater
Portland Language Bank for compiling a list of potential interpreters. In Connecticut, the
Chief Court Interpreter in Hartford and his assistant in Bridgeport qualify interpreters and
assign them where needed. In Rhode Island, interpreters are selected by court administrators
through placement agencies. Regarding the appointment of an interpreter in a judicial pro-
ceeding, the presiding judge ultimately exercises that responsibility. See supra note 43 and
accompanying text. (The practices of the New England states regarding selection were con-
firmed in telephone interviews the author conducted with the respective court administrators in
July and August 1995)).
116 The 1985 recommendation of the New Jersey Task Force was that the "Chief Justice
should recommend that the Chancellor of the Department of Higher Education designate sev-
eral public institutions as centers for (1) training court interpreters .... " NEw JERSEY TASK
FORCE, supra note 71, at 183. This recommendation led to the preparation of the court inter-
preter curriculum guidelines referred to herein as the New Jersey Guidelines. See generally
NEw JERSEY GUIDELINES, supra note 65.
117 The 1990 recommendation of the Washington Court Interpreter Advisory Committee
that long-term education of court interpreters be "coordinated through the Higher Education
and/or Community College Boards" and "be developed in Washington's community college
and/or university extension system." WASHINGTON INTERIm REPORT, supra note 70, at 8. This
recommendation is consistent with WASH. REv. CODE § 2.43.070(2) (1989).
118 "It is unrealistic for court policy makers and court managers to expect that [longer
term, formalized programs of education and training for court interpreters] can be designed or
paid for with court funds." MODEL GUIDES, supra note 11, at 53.
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education curricula with the administrative office of the courts of the
state in which they are located. This will assure that the curriculum be-
ing designed is consistent with the needs of local courts and is appropri-
ate to the certification process that will confront graduates upon
completion of their training.
The efficiency of this design whereby courts certify and academic
institutions train is unfortunately not universally accepted. The Massa-
chusetts model, by statute, places the responsibility for both training and
certifying court interpreters in the Office of Court Interpreter Services, 119
a department of the Administrative Office of the Trial Court. The diffi-
culties created by this arrangement are far-reaching. They affect both the
functioning of the interpreter services office itself and the relationship
between that office and any academic institution seeking to establish an
interpreter training program. As to the functioning of the office, the bur-
dens placed upon the director are overwhelming. She must train, test,
and certify interpreters in several languages; coordinate the assignment
of interpreters as needed throughout the state on a daily basis; assure the
payment of interpreters for the delivery of interpreter services; and con-
duct disciplinary hearings for those interpreters accused of violating the
code of professional responsibility.120
The practical result of placing such a heavy burden on the Massa-
chusetts Office of Court Interpreter Services is that the educational func-
tion has not been accomplished. Since 1993, no interpreter training has
been undertaken by that office and no new interpreters have been certi-
fied. 121 Further, this assignment of the training function to the Office of
119 "The coordinator of court interpreter services ... shall specifically: (1) establish and
conduct a training program for interpreters in which they shall be trained and examined on
language proficiency, proper conduct in court, professional ethics and other matters deemed
appropriate and after successfully completing the course shall be duly certified .... " MAss.
GEN. L. ch. 221C, § 7(e)(1) (1986).
120 Id. § 7(e)(2-4).
121 During 1995-1996, the Massachusetts Senate Post Audit and Oversight Bureau con-
ducted a review of court interpreter services in Massachusetts at the request of the Senate
Majority Leader Thomas Norton. A major finding of the review related to interpreter training
and examination for certification. The review found: "During the last three years, O.C.I.S.
[Office of Court Interpreter Services] halted training and examination for common and rare
languages because of lack of funding." SENATOR THOMAs NORTON, SENATOR THoMAs NOR-
TON RELEASES REvIEw OF COURT INTERPRETER SERVICES, Feb. 13, 1996 (on file with author).
Since the writing of this article, Massachusetts has moved to revise the mandate of O.C.I.S. by
contracting with the University of Massachusetts to train and certify court interpreters. In the
author's view, while placing the training element in the hands of the University is a positive
move by Massachusetts, the accompanying placement of the certification aspect of O.C.I.S.'s
mandate is troubling. Such a move not only appears to be an abdication by the court of its
traditional responsibility to certify those who practice within the courtroom, but also may lead
to the creation of a monopoly within the state for the training of interpreters since students
would likely be inclined to attend a training program that led to certification rather than one
that did not. As a public policy matter, it would seem that in view of the already-noted
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Court Interpreter Services complicates any relationship between that of-
fice and academic institutions in Massachusetts that might contemplate
undertaking a court interpreter training program. Primarily, the issue
here is whether an academic program can or would be recognized as a
substitute for the statutorily mandated training program of the Office of
Court Interpreter Services. Secondarily, the issue is whether students
who complete a training program at an academic institution will be al-
lowed to sit immediately for the certification examination without further
training. In sum, colleges and universities should review the relevant
statutes and rules of court in their state on the issues of certification and
training and develop a strategy to meet them.
The second issue of concern to colleges and universities entering
into the field of court interpreter training is the issue of cost. Cost is
always an issue in higher education, of course, but in interpreter training
it comes with its own unique signature. For instance, if a college were to
offer a program in paralegal education, all students in the program could
be enrolled in one sequence of courses with each course capable of being
taught by one instructor. The available student body for such a program
sequence would potentially be large while instructor salary costs per stu-
dent would be low for the college.
If a college were to offer a program in interpreter training, however,
the equation would be much more complicated. To start with, not all
interpreter students could be enrolled in the same sequence of courses.
For instance, a sequence of courses taught for Spanish-English interpret-
ers could not also be taken by Russian-English interpreters or
Cambodian-English interpreters. For obvious reasons, each group would
require its own classroom with its own instructor. As one can imagine,
the cost of offering such a program for ten Spanish-English students, ten
Russian-English, and ten Cambodian-English students would be much
higher than offering a program for thirty paralegal students, all of whom
speak one language.
While cost is a unique issue in interpreter training, two strategies
may assist in resolving the funding dilemma. The first strategy is a tried
and true one: seek outside funding sources for scholarships, equipment
purchases, and establishing faculty chairs. Sources can range from fed-
eral and state agencies to state bar associations and to corporations and
businesses that have an interest in the issue either because they operate
within a community with a significant number of non-English speakers
shortage of competent court interpreters, the interest of access to the courts would be better
served by encouraging as many colleges and universities as possible within the state to estab-
lish curricula for the training of interpreters.
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or because they do business internationally. 122 For state-sponsored col-
leges and universities, increased legislative appropriations also ought to
be part of the solution.
A second strategy for cost containment has been followed by Van-
couver Community College (British Columbia) and by the University of
Minnesota. It is "the multilingual model" for classroom interpreter train-
ing. Bruce Downing, who directs the interpreter program at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota (Minneapolis), describes the model as follows:
"Instead of setting up separate programs for each language pair, one pro-
gram can accommodate them all by focusing on theoretical and practical
topics that are germane to all interpreting students and then breaking into
groups based on language pairs for language-specific issues and inter-
preting lab work." 123 Of course, such an approach would still require
separate tutors to work with the smaller, same-language pair groups in
addition to the lead instructor who would teach all students together on
the topics of common interest. The costs actually saved in operating the
multilingual model would depend upon the number of tutors required and
would also need to be balanced against the development costs for such a
model. Assuming, however, that the model is developed and that the
lead instructor and tutors establish a compatible and continuous pedagog-
ical relationship, the model ought to realize some cost saving.
The third issue of concern for colleges and universities entering
upon the field of interpreter education must be the recruitment of compe-
tent faculty. Because court interpreter training is a relatively new effort,
however, the pool of qualified faculty is not large. Many individuals
already practicing as court interpreters did not have the advantage of de-
veloping their skills and vocabulary in a training environment deliber-
ately focused on teaching sight translation, consecutive and simultaneous
interpretation, and the professional standards of practice. Most court in-
terpreters would affirm that they simply taught themselves to be inter-
preters. Often, individuals who are bilingual are believed to be capable
of interpreting. Thus, many court interpreters were pressed into service
unprepared and subsequently built on the experience. As a result, some
or many of these individuals will have been inadequately prepared to
undertake an instructor's role in an interpreter program. Also, many in-
dividuals practicing as court interpreters may not be certified by any ju-
122 The University of Minnesota has been successful in its attempts to obtain outside
funding for its interpreter training program. Both the Federal Office of Refugee Settlement
and the Bush Foundation have made substantial contributions. Telephone Interview with
Bruce Downing, Interpreter Program Director, University of Minnesota (Jul. 10, 1995).
123 BRUCE T. DOWNING & LAURIE SwABEY, A MULTILINGUAL MODEL FOR TRAmING
HEALTH CARE INTPrERnTaRs 9-10 (Dec. 10, 1991). A workshop based on this paper was
presented at the National Conference on Health and Mental Health of Soviet Refugees, held in
Chicago on Dec. 10-12, 1991.
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dicial authority. While these individuals may be competent, they may
lack the credentials that colleges and universities invariably require of
their faculties. Finally, recalling the fact that interpreter training is not
foreign language-centered, 124 it should be clear that most modem lan-
guage college faculty, although bilingual, will have not been trained in
the skills required of a court interpreter. This will eliminate most mod-
em language instructors from the pool of potential interpreter training
faculty.
As a starting point in recruiting interpreter faculty, therefore, it
seems appropriate to seek out those individuals who meet three criteria:
individuals who have at least a bachelor's degree, who are certified to
function as court interpreters by some judicial authority (for example, the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts), and who have actual
interpreting experience in the courtroom. Of course, if an individual
meets all three criteria and also has some teaching experience in any
subject area, that person should be rated as a very good candidate for
faculty recruitment.
V. CONCLUSION
The need to create viable programs to train court interpreters is a
clarion call to colleges and universities to move to the forefront in the
development and design of interpreter training curricula. Taking their
cue from the professional standards of practice for court interpreters, col-
leges and universities must work with their state judicial administrators
to develop instructional programs that incorporate the goals of accuracy,
honesty, and professionalism for interpreters. In order to accomplish
this, these academic institutions must provide instruction in the commu-
nication-based tasks of sight translation, and consecutive and simultane-
ous interpretation, and in the professional standards of practice for
interpreters. The design of curricula to accomplish these objectives can
take several forms. These can include undergraduate and graduate-level
degree programs, continuing education certificate programs, or other
types of sequenced training that meet the peculiar needs of the localities
within which the academic institution functions. The creation and opera-
tion at the university level of quality instructional programs for court
interpretation will increase the number of qualified court interpreters. In
turn, this increase will assist the courts in meeting their responsibility to
eliminate the fear and distrust of the judicial system felt by many non-
English speakers so that all receive equal access to justice.
124 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
